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Abstract 
 
USDA's quarterly forecasts of fiscal year agricultural exports by 
commodity and region were examined for their reliability in 
predicting annual changes during 1977-89.  Most of the forecasts 
were strongly correlated with actual exports.  Most obvious 
exceptions probably stemmed from rounding errors.  Bias was not a 
problem for the forecasts of total exports in any quarter, nor 
for most of the commodity forecasts.  There was some upward bias 
in the forecasts for less developed countries, and downward bias 
for some developed countries. The USDA forecasts were 
conservative; they were more likely to underestimate the 
magnitude of change than to overestimate it. 
 
Keywords:  Exports, fore casting, accuracy, export programs, 
commodities, high-value products. 
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Introduction 
 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) short-term forecasts 
are probably the most widely disseminated agricultural forecasts 
in the world. They are generally believed to be accurate, and, 
while specific forecast1s are occasionally questioned, they remain 
the benchmark against which alternative forecasts are compared. 
The accuracy of USDA's forecasts is, therefore, of vital concern. 
This report examines the accuracy of the fiscal year forecasts of 
U.S. agricultural exports that USDA publishes quarterly in its 
Outlook for U . S .  Agricultural Exports. 
 
USDA's quarterly export forecasts were found to be largely 
efficient and unbiased, although they showed signs of being 
consistently cautious.  The forecasts for grain exports were the 
most accurate of the group. They generally had the smallest 
percentage error and the best correlation, but the magnitude of 
change was conservatively forecast. Given the importance of 
grain to total exports, this led to conservative forecasts of 
change for total U.S. agricultural exports. Cotton exports were 
also accurate, matching grains in correlation, but showing upward 
bias and larger average errors. 
 
In addition to cotton {'value), USDA's forecasts were determined 
to be upwardly biased for Eastern Europe, South Asia, East and 
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. Forecasts 
were determined to be downwardly biased for rice (volume), animal 
fats, sugar and tropical products, the former soviet Union, and 
Latin America. USDA's forecast for livestock products was also 
biased downward, but that was probably due to a tendency to 
underestimate change coinciding with a period of rapidly rising 
exports. Although the result of this tendency was a set of 
forecasts that averaged significantly lower than actual exports, 
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such bias would probably not have appeared if livestock exports 
had trended downward or tended not to grow. 
 
It is desirable to eliminate systematic errors from any forecast, 
but increasing forecast reliability is likely to entail costs. 
Any desire to improve forecast accuracy must be balanced by 
considerations of how costs compare with benefits.  In any case, 
the first step is discovering systematic errors.  Unforeseeable 
events will always result in some forecast error, but when errors 
fall into discernible patterns, they represent behavior that can 
be altered to improve forecast accuracy. 
 
USDA's Forecasts 
 
Each month USDA publish• s forecasts of the annual levels of 
production, consumption, trade, and stocks for key commodities 
and countries. The forecasts are produced by an interagency 
process that includes the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), 
the Agricultural stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS), 
the Economic Research Service (ERS), the Foreign Agricultural 
Service (FAS), National Agricultural Statistics Service  (NASS), 
and the World Agricultural outlook Board (WAOB).  Annual U.S. 
average farm prices are also forecast for key commodities each 
month. These are forecasts of annual totals on crop marketing 
years or calendar years, and they are published in the World 
Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates. 
 
Every 3 months USDA publishes forecasts of U.S. fiscal year 
exports for a smaller group of commodities in the Outlook for 
U.S. Agricultural Exports.   Forecasts for most of these 
commodities are also published monthly, but some forecasts are 
published only quarterly.  Total agricultural export value and 
volume forecasts for the United States are available only 
quarterly.  The same is true of all the other forecasts of annual 
export value. These include forecasts of the total value of U.S. 
agricultural exports to selected countries and regions during the 
current fiscal year and forecasts of commodity export values. 
The forecasts analyzed included 15 different commodities by 
value, 10 commodities by volume, and 21 regional aggregations. 
Forecasts published during 1977-89 were studied. 
 
Quarterly forecasts are produced through an interagency process, 
but with only ERS, FAS, and the WAOB participating.  As much as 
possible, these quarterly forecasts are intended to be consistent 
with the most recent monthly forecasts, which precede the 
quarterly forecasts by a few weeks.  Quarterly forecasts are 
consistent with the monthly forecasts even when more current 
information indicates that conditions determining the monthly 
forecasts have changed. This is unusual and is acknowledged in 
the outlook for U.S. Agricultural Exports when necessary. 
Updates are published between quarters if circumstances warrant. 
These updates were not included in this analysis. 
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Table 1--Timing of USDA's quarterly export forecasts 
 
Order of 
publication 
Month 
published 
Export data 
available 
 
First quarter November or 
December 
 
None 
Second quarter 
Third quarter 
Fourth quarter 
February 
May 
August 
October-December 
October-March 
October-June 
 
The first forecast of the fiscal year is published in late 
November or early December when no official trade data are 
available {table 1). A revised forecast is published 3 months 
later in late February with actual export data available for the 
first 3 months of the fiscal year. When the next revised 
forecast is published, 6 months of actual data are available, and 
when the final forecast is published, 9 months of actual data are 
available. In other words, the final forecast of total fiscal 
year exports is actually made with only 3 months of exports 
unknown. These later forecasts are therefore very accurate. 
 
An important point is that each quarter's forecasts are 
conditional on different information sets. Throughout this 
report, four sets of quarterly forecasts are compared. These are 
not necessarily forecasts made through different processes (for 
example, using different models), but forecasts made with 
increasing amounts of information. The question of what sort of 
models produce the forecasts is a good one.  In general terms, 
the process is best described as using a "delphic" method, 
averaging the judgment of a large number of experts. 
 
Forecast Analysis 
 
In this report, USDA's quarterly forecasts of fiscal year exports 
were tested by regressing actual exports (Ai) on export forecasts (Fi). These regressions yielded measures of correlation that are used to measure efficiency. The regressions also provided 
estimated coefficient values that were tested to determine bias 
and consistency. Regression analysis was used rather than 
decomposition of mean squared error {MSE} because of regression's 
superior ability to separate the effects of bias and consistency 
(see Appendix). Regression analysis also lends itself to 
statistical testing to determine the significance of the results. 
 
"Efficiency's" general econometric meaning refers to an 
estimator's 11 spread11  around its expected value. In this report, 
the term efficiency is used in a somewhat similar sense and is 
  measured by the correlation between a forecast (F) and its actual 
variable (A). Correlation is used rather than a measure of 
variance between F and A (σF-A)in order to allow comparison between different forecasts because correlation is always 
between 0 and 1 regardless of the magnitude of the variables. 
Correlation is also affected by the randomness of the spread. A 
forecast with low σF-A might be less accurate than one with a high σF-A. To completely understand forecast error, knowledge of the pattern of error is as critical as that of its size. 
 
Bias refers to whether we can expect the forecast to exceed the 
actual variable or perhaps vice versa. The expected value of the 
difference between the forecast and the actual variable must be 
zero for the forecast 1to be unbiased: 
 
E(F-A)=0. 
 
Consistency generally refers to the asymptotic property of an 
estimator: the increasing accuracy of an estimator's ability to 
approximate the parameter as sample size increases. In this 
report, consistency also refers to a parameter value. 
Consistency is perhaps best understood here as the forecast's 
ability to predict the magnitude of change in a variable. 
Consistency refers to a parameter value because when a series of 
annual forecasts are compared with the respective actual values 
of the variable through a regression equation, 
dAi= α+βdFi+ei, 
 
then a consistent forecast is one where the estimated β =  1. 
Inconsistency and bias may be indistinguishable in some cases. 
If an otherwise perfect forecast were decreased by 10 percent 
every year, there would be a downward bias equal to 10 percent of 
the average value of the actual data over the sample period, and β could equal 1.11. 
 
Consistency and bias also determine if a forecast is rational. 
Forecasts have been used to measure expectations and tested to 
see if these expectations conform to the rational expectations 
hypothesis. If a test of α and β estimated in the above 
Regression α = 0 and β = 1 cannot be rejected, then the forecast 
is described as rational. This is a weak-form test for 
rationality (7). 1 This. report does not explicitly explore 
whether USDA’s export forecasts are rational, but most of the 
forecasts described in this report as either biased or 
inconsistent also fail the above weak-form test for rationality. 
 
 
 
 
 
1Underscored numbers in parentheses refer to citations in 
the References section. 
 
4 
  Whether or not bias and inconsistency are separable depends 
on the behavior of the actual variable. In the example above, 
if the actual variable always fell or always rose, then β  = 
1.11. If the variable rose half the time and fell half the 
time in roughly the same magnitude, then β =1.00, and the 
bias would be obvious. Figure 1 presents an example of the 
first case, with actual U.S. exports to Eastern Europe largely 
declining during 1977-89.  The forecast is inconsistent and 
almost significantly biased, and evidence for both can be seen 
in the graph. Figure 2 is an example of an inconsistent 
forecast with no bias.  U.S. exports to Sub-Saharan Africa 
rose and fell in an offsetting manner during 1977-89, but the 
USDA forecast underestimated the magnitude of change in 10 out 
of 13 years. 
 
In this report, most of USDA•s forecasts examined were 
determined to be efficient. The exceptions were largely confined 
to commodities or regions where exports were so small that 
rounding played a significant role in determining the forecast. 
In the first quarter (the forecasts published in November or 
December), only two forecasts had average errors above 22 
percent, and by the last quarter (published in August) the 
forecast for total U.S. exports was wrong by less than 2 percent 
on average. Few commodity 'forecasts appear biased, but both 
upward and downward bias were more common in the regional 
forecasts. 
 Some key forecasts showed signs of inconsistency. The magnitude of change in total u.s. export value was typically 
underestimated. The same was true of grain exports, particularly 
when exports were falling. Underestimating the magnitude of 
change was more common than overestimating it. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Mean squared error (MSE) is perhaps the most frequently used 
measure of forecast accuracy. It is particularly appealing when 
comparing various models predicting a common dependent variable. 
If the various models' equations are estimated using ordinary 
least squares (OLS), then each model's parameters will be 
estimated so as to minimize the sum of squared errors (SSE). 
Taking a mean of the squared errors simply normalizes SSE by 
sample size: 
 
 
 
where F is the series of forecasts and A the actual data. 
The goal in this report is to measure the reliability of 
forecasts of many different variables rather than one variable 
with different models; MSE is not an appropriate statistic 
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  because the MSE of a variable averaging $30 billion would not be 
comparable to the MSE ,of a variable averaging $300 million. 
However, MSE can be "decomposed" into components that provide more 
specific characterizations of forecast reliability. The simplest 
decomposition, 
    22)( AFAFFMSE    
 
separates MSE into a statistic measuring bias and another 
measuring the variance of the forecast errors. The effect of 
bias on forecast accuracy is clear, but the inevitable variation of 
the errors can take many forms. Therefore, a simple measure of 
forecast error variance is inadequate in characterizing 
reliability. Also, the variance of forecast errors (as with MSE) 
is not independent of the magnitude of the variables in question. 
 
Correlation, however, is independent of magnitude. Granger and 
Newbold (1) demonstrate through a further decomposition of MSE 
that correlation between a series of forecasts and a series of 
matching actual data is a good measure for analyzing these 
further errors in variation. 
   AFFAAFAFFMSE  2)( 222   
 
 
j of deviation standardj   
 
 
F. and A of ncorrelatioFA   
 
 
This equation shows that MSE(F) is minimized by a smaller bias and 
a larger correlation. Equivalence between the two series' 
variances would not minimize MSE(F), except when bias is zero and 
correlation is perfect: 
  AFFAF
F
FMSE  
 2)( , and 
 
 
 
 
 
Kost (6), Maddala (8), and others point out that correlation is a 
poor measure of forecast reliability because it does not account 
for bias or some other systematic linear error. Correlation, 
however, is not the sole measure of reliability in this report, but 
it is combined with further measures of bias and consistency. 
 
The accuracy of USDA's quarterly forecasts of U.S. agricultural 
exports by commodity and region were analyzed by regressing 
series of actual data on their respective forecasts: 
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These regressions yielded coefficients of determination (R2) that 
were used to measure 1the efficiency of the forecasts and 
coefficient values that were tested to determine bias and  
consistency2. As the "d" preceding Ai and Fi implies, forecasts were examined as forecasts of the amount of change. 
 
This is not the form in which they were published.  USDA 
publishes its forecasts as rounded actual values. The previous 
year's level of the variable was subtracted from the published 
forecast for the current year. Thus, dAi = Ai-Ai-1 and dFi = Fi-Ai-1. Regardless of whether the forecast is measured as dFi or as Fi, if a forecast is perfect throughout the sample, then Ai = Fi, dAi = dFi, and, therefore α = 0 and β = 1.  Similarly, the level of bias will be the same regardless of how the forecast is stated. 
 
Expressing the forecast as a difference removes the effect of a 
trend that is irrelevant to understanding the pattern of errors 
in these particular forecasts.  Long-term trends will always be 
embodied in the Fi forecasts. However, the forecasts studied 
here are always for one period ahead. Therefore, any trends of 
the preceding years will spuriously appear to be correctly 
forecasted. That is, including long-term trends will raise 
measured forecast accuracy to no useful end. 
 
In addition to inflating R2, when one uses Ai and Fi rather 
than dAi and dFi, one also introduces a multiyear effect into 
the estimated β. The only difference between the two series, Ai and Fi, will be the errors in Fi's single-year forecast. The 
value of β in the regression will reflect the apparent errors 
in forecasting the trend introduced by incorrectly forecasting 
one year's change. It would be difficult to meaningfully 
interpret β in such circumstances. 
 
The use of Ai and Fi rather than dAi and dFi can be described as 
imposing a strong restriction on the model below: 
 
 
.1
,1
,,
3
2
1321
1
1











and
with
AdFA
FA
thenAdFFGiven
iii
ii
iii
 
 
 
 
Using dAi and dFi imposes only one restriction,β3β1 = 1. 
 
 
2In a regression with one independent variable, the square 
root of the R2 equals the simple correlation between the 
dependent and independent variables. 
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  In some studies, the term efficiency has a broader meaning that 
combines both consistency and efficiency. For example, both 
Thomson (.9.)  and Dietrich and Gutierrez (1) use the above 
regression to test reliability. In both articles,β = 1 is 
described as a test of efficiency. In fact, β can be affected by 
bias (see Appendix), and a forecast with β ≠ 1 and β ≠ 0 can be 
quite different from one with β = 0. Kost (6)   describes 
efficiency more broadly, saying both α  = o and β = 1 are 
necessary for a forecast to be efficient, but he also notes that 
these conditions are necessary to ensure an absence of bias. 
Granger and Newbold demonstrate that some forecasts meeting these 
two conditions are far from efficient, "according to any 
acceptable interpretation of that word" (p. 40, 3). 
 
Efficiency has a more restrictive meaning in this report. 
Efficiency is measured with little reference to the regression 
coefficients, using correlation. Consistency refers to the 
ability to correctly forecast the magnitude of change and is 
determined by testing β = 1. 
 
Suppose a hypothetical forecast for grain exports published 
during each of the four quarters is examined. The first 
quarter's forecast may not be correct in forecasting even the 
direction of change. In that case, the regression will probably 
yield an estimated value for p  that is not significantly 
different from zero. This is because there is too much random 
error in the forecast to yield a statistically significant 
relationship between dAi and dFi. Correlation will naturally be 
low. In this study, the highest R2 of a regression with an 
estimated β = 0 was 0.43, with results below 0.20 more common. 
 
The next earliest forecast will probably be more efficient. 
Correlation would be higher and regression would probably yield a 
value of f3   significantly different from zero. The weakest 
definition of efficiency would describe any forecast with a 
regression value of significantly different from zero as 
efficient. In other words, the amount of random error is small 
enough to reveal some relationship between dAi and dFi. Because most of the forecasts examined surpass this criterion, the 
additional condition that the R21 s of their respective 
regressions must be at least 0.80 was arbitrarily imposed. With 
an R2 of at least 0.80, correlation between actual and forecasted 
change reaches at least:0.89. The forecast is usually correct 
with respect to direction of change and has limited variation in 
errors in predicting the magnitude of change. 
 
If a forecast is efficient, then β ≠ 0, and if there is no bias, 
then testing the difference of the estimated β from 1 reveals 
consistency. If the forecast's estimated value of β  is not 
significantly different from 1, then there is no tendency to 
over- or underestimate the magnitude of annual change. If β is 
less than 1, change is typically overestimated: if β  is more than 
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  1, change is underestimated.   This is distinct from bias, which 
would depend on the average level of forecasted change. For 
example, inconsistency would be likely if USDA forecasted a $250 
million decline one year and then a $600 million increase the next, 
while the actual changes in those years were $200 million down, then 
$500 million up. First, USDA would have made a 25-percent 
overestimate of a decline, and then a 20-percent overestimate of an 
increase.  The forecasts differ in that one is too high and one is 
too low, but the average level of the estimates is close to zero. 
Bias would be likely if the second forecast had been a $400 million 
increase rather than $500 million. Then the forecasts are too low 
in both years, with an average further from zero. 
 
Bias and consistency are not always so obviously separated. The 
above examples involve a variable that both increases and decreases. 
Over a longer period, the variable would possibly average to zero, 
showing neither an increasing nor a decreasing trend. If the actual 
data are always changing in one direction, then bias in the same 
direction implies that change is typically overestimated, and bias 
in the opposite direction implies that change is underestimated. If 
change in the actual data averages to zero (no trend) and a forecast 
is biased, then 1)  there are offsetting errors in estimating the 
magnitude of change, 2) there are errors in predicting the magnitude 
of change in one particular direction, or 3) the pattern is unclear. 
The relationship between bias and consistency is discussed in the 
section on consistency. 
 
Another summary statistic presented for each forecast series is mean 
absolute percent error (MAPE) (tables 2-4). MAPE provides 
comparison between forecasts of series with different average 
values. The errors are put into absolute values to ensure that 
over- and underestimates do not offset into a mean of zero. Squaring 
errors for a MSE serves the same purpose, and a square root of a 
mean squared percent error (RMSPE) would provide a statistic 
similar to MAPE. The difference between RMSPE and MAPE is that 
RMSPE gives larger weight to larger errors. 
 
 
Results 
 Examination of 48 series of U.S. agricultural exports forecast by 
USDA found that forecasts made during the first quarter have MAPE 
generally ranging from 6 to 22 percent (tables 2-4). Two 
forecasts exceeded this range, the forecasts of U.S. exports to 
China and the former USSR, with MAPE of 66 and 37 percent, 
respectively. China and the former USSR were generally the 
world's largest grain importers during 1977-89.  They were also 
the world's largest grain producers, and their imports fluctuated 
widely with shortfalls in production. The first quarter's 
forecasts are published well in advance of the period when grain 
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  supplies in these countries are determined for the year and, 
therefore, well in advance of events determining their highly 
variable demand for gratin. A relative lack of reliable 
information concerning events within these countries also 
hampered forecast accuracy during the period studied. 
 
Much of the 37-percent average error in the forecasts for the 
former USSR stems from a partial U.S. embargo on grain sales to 
the Soviets following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. If 
that year were excluded, the average first quarter error would be 
27 percent, much closer to the normal range. This illustrates an 
important point about forecast accuracy. A forecast can be 
inaccurate because either the forecaster does not understand how 
circumstances can affect trade, or because these circumstances 
change. The former error should be avoided, while the latter is 
often unavoidable. 
 
The first-quarter forecast of total export value tended to be off 
by 10 percent, and volume by 8 percent. By the last quarter, the 
forecast for total expo1rt value had a 1.4-percent MAPE, and the 
forecasts’ MAPE for most major commodities were below 5 
percent. The regional forecasts were only slightly less 
accurate.  Most of the forecasts for individual commodities and 
regions were only slightly less accurate than the forecasts for 
total value and volume. Better accuracy in the total forecasts 
is not surprising because they are aggregations of the individual 
commodity forecasts. Offsetting errors among the commodity and 
regional forecasts probably improve the accuracy of the totals. 
 
The accuracy of the forecasts in most cases improved with each 
subsequent quarter, in other words, 
 
MAPE1>MAPE2>MAPE3>MAPE4 
and, 
R21 < R22 < R23 < R24. 
  
The only exceptions were the value forecasts for rice, dairy 
products, Oceania, and Canada, and the volume forecasts for 
animal fats, tobacco, and rice. The exceptions number less than 
10 percent of all forecasts examined. 
 
Most of these exceptions are probably the result of random 
rounding errors.  Forecasts are published in rounded numbers: to 
the nearest $100 million and 100,000 tons. If a commodity's 
exports never vary by more than these amounts, forecast errors 
are inevitable. Tobacco volume forecasts were particularly 
vulnerable: exports were always between 200,000 tons and 300,000 
tons during 1977-89, often closer to 250,000 tons than to any 
publishable forecast. Similarly, exports to Oceania have slowly 
fluctuated between $200 million and $300 million. 
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Canada is a special case due to chronic reporting errors. During 
1977-89, U.S. agricultural exports to Canada were underreported 
by as much as $1 billion each year.  Canadian import data showed 
about so percent more U.S. agricultural products entering Canada 
than did the U.S. export data reported by USDA and the u.s. 
Department of Commerce. For the forecasts to correctly align 
with the underreported export data, it would have been necessary 
to both estimate what Canada imported and what went uncounted. 
 
There is no such simpl1e explanation for rice. The rice forecasts 
are examined more carefully in the discussion of consistency. 
 
 
Correlation 
 
Efficiency was naturally weakest for the first-quarter forecasts. 
Less than half the R2 values for the first-quarter commodity 
forecasts were above 0.50 (tables 5-7). Total export value had 
an R2 of 0.38, while volume reached only 0.20.  A total of 14 
first-quarter forecasts were so explicitly inefficient that β was 
not significantly different from zero, including total export 
volume.3 The regional forecasts generally have slightly better 
R2 values than the commodity value forecasts, and the commodity 
value forecast R2   values were better than those for volume. This 
was true in every quarter. 
 
By the fourth quarter, it was unusual to find R2 values below 
0.90, and common to observe values above 0.95. Out of 20 
regional forecasts analyzed, 13 showed R2 of at least 0.95.  The 
same was true with most of the other forecasts. 
 
The regional forecasts were more efficient in all quarters, and 
value was also more efficient than volume. (These are very 
general statements  based on the frequency that any forecast's R 2 
in one group significantly exceeded any forecast's R2 in another 
group.4)  When accuracy is measured by MAPE, the regional 
 
 
3The other forecasts were: Western Europe, North Africa, 
the Middle East, Other Latin America, developed countries, 
oilseeds and products, soybean value, soybean meal value, 
livestock products, co2trse grains volume, tobacco volume, animal 
fats volume, and other volume. 
 
4The further the population correlation is from zero, the 
more skewed is the sample distribution of its estimator. We 
assume all correlations; between these forecasts and their 
respective variables are substantially different from zero. 
However, it is possible to transform such a sample correlation 
into a variable that is normally distributed, assuming that the 
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 forecasts are less accurate than the commodity forecasts. One 
implication is that there is m ore systematic error in the 
regional forecasts and more random error in the commodity 
forecasts. Bias is found more frequently among the regional 
forecasts, as noted earlier. This may be the source of the 
higher MAPE, since inconsistency does not seem particularly more 
common among the regional forecasts. 
 
The higher R2 values for the regional forecasts may also reflect 
differences in the characteristics of global versus regional 
trade. An individual country's demand for imports varies more 
than global demand; therefore, there is somewhat more variation 
in U.S. exports by region than by commodity. Given two 
forecasts--one commodity and one region, for example--equally 
accurate in terms of MAPE, but with more variation in exports to 
the region, then the regional forecast will show higher 
correlation with actual exports. 
 
The commodity value forecasts were more accurate than the volume 
forecasts both in terms of MAPE and R2 • USDA generally bas 
enough information about global supply and demand to correctly 
forecast the direction of change. This makes the value forecasts 
more accurate because 1they embody the correct direction in prices 
as well as volume. 
 
The greater ease of forecasting export value is also demonstrated 
by differences in how accuracy increased from one quarter to the 
next. The R2, as noted above, rises almost invariably. However, 
some of these changes were too small to be statistically 
significant. Statistically significant improvements in R2 are 
more common for the regional and volume forecasts than for the 
commodity value forecasts in any quarter-to-quarter comparison. 
 
No forecast's R2 showed a significant deterioration, but some 
forecasts never improved from one quarter to another. 5  The 
forecasts failing to improve their correlation were generally the 
same forecasts that showed anomalous quarter-to-quarter changes 
in MAPE. These forecasts also failed to reach the R2 threshold 
of 0.80, along with the forecasts for other volume and Oceania. 
 
 
 
 
sample size is larger than 10 (4): 
 
.
3
1
,
1
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2
1

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The transformed variable lends itself to statistical testing. 
 
5Tobacco value and volume, dairy, and animal fats. 
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Most forecasts by the third quarter had R 2 exceeding 0.80. 
Exceptions included the forecasts for high-value products (HVP). 
The third-quarter forecasts for livestock, poultry, dairy, and 
horticultural products all had an R2 below 0.80. The below- 
average accuracy of these forecasts may reflect the effect of the 
data problems with Canadian trade. Canada is one of the largest 
buyers of HVP's from the United States. Horticultural products, 
however, performed the best of this group, with a third-quarter 
R2=0.76, and horticultural exports were the most underreported of 
any commodity group. 
 
Relatively poor efficiency for the HVP forecasts may have stemmed 
from a concentration of USDA's resources on program commodities. 
The differentiated nature of these goods multiplies the number of 
markets that would have to be monitored to anticipate events. 
Furthermore, USDA's intelligence gathering and analysis are 
geared toward low-value crops because of several priorities. One 
priority is that durin9 much of the past 20 years, low-value 
products have dominated. u.s. agricultural exports, Also, a 
substantially larger proportion of u.s. production is exported 
for low-value crops than for most high-value products. Perhaps 
most important, domestic commodity programs involving substantial 
Government  expenditure exist for most low-value crops, 
necessitating increased vigilance by and for policymakers. 
 
Another third-quarter forecast with an R2   below 0.80 was soybean 
value. Soybean value was not particularly inconsistent with an 
R2=78, but this R2   was significantly below the R2   for wheat, 
cotton, and coarse grain value. In all quarters, the oilseed 
product forecasts seemed less consistent than grain forecasts. 
For example, the direction of change in wheat volume and coarse 
grain value were always correctly forecast. But, the direction 
of change for oilseeds and products was incorrectly forecast 54 
percent of the time. The first quarter R2 values of grains and 
feeds and oilseeds and products were significantly different at 
0.60 and 0.05, respectively. Finally, among the very few 
forecasts whose R2 surpassed 0.80 during the second quarter are 
grains and feeds, coarse grains value, and cotton value and 
volume. 
 
The United States accounts for a substantially larger share of 
world trade in soybeans than for grains or cotton. During 1977- 
89, the u.s. share of w orld trade in soybeans was as high as 92 
percent, while wheat, coarse grains, and cotton peaked at 47, 72, 
and 39  percent. Both the number  of significant competitors and 
the number of significant customers are smaller for soybeans than 
for other products, and competitors are largely confined to the 
Southern Hemisphere. This concentration increases the effect of 
unforeseen events in key countries. Finally, the reliability of 
the cotton export forecasts is probably improved by cotton 
importers' extensive use of forward contracting. 
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  This uncertainty in soybean trade probably accounts for the poor 
consistency of USDA's forecasts for Western Europe. Grain 
exports to Western Europe declined significantly during 1977-89, 
as the European Community's price supports drove grain production 
steadily higher. As a result, U.S. agricultural exports to 
Western Europe are almost exclusively composed of oilseeds and 
products and high-value products, all products with inconsistent 
forecasts in the early quarters. 
 
 
Bias 
 
As forecast efficiency improves in the later quarters, one can 
measure bias and consistency. The ability to measure bias does 
not necessarily depend on strong correlation, but the weaker the 
bias, the greater the correlation must be to prove it is not a 
random occurrence. 
 
In the regression equations shown earlier, the average difference 
between the forecasts and actual exports (or bias) can be found 
and tested by estimating with β  restricted  to 1. If the forecast 
is biased, then the estimated value of α  will be significantly 
different from zero. This is essentially a "matched pair" test 
where the differences between the forecasts and actual trade are 
averaged across the sample (4). For example, the first-quarter 
forecasts for exports to North Africa averaged $124 million 
higher than actual exports during 1977-89 (table 8).  This is the 
estimated bias resulting either from a restricted regression or 
from the matched-pair test.6 
 
Bias occurred more frequently in the regional forecasts than in 
the commodity forecasts, and upward bias was more often found to 
be statistically significant than downward bias. Upward bias was 
generally found among the forecasts for the less developed 
countries and downward bias in the forecasts for developed 
countries. 
 
The forecasts for North Africa and South Asia were upwardly 
biased in every quarter, although by smaller amounts in later 
quarters (table 8). During the first quarter, these forecasts 
were the only two that demonstrated statistically significant 
bias, with North Africa $124 million too high and South Asia $186 
million too high. In the last two quarters, Eastern Europe, the 
Middle East, and East and Southeast Asia were biased upward. 
 
 
 
6The standard deviation of this average bias is calculated 
differently in the matched pair test than is the deviation for α 
in the restricted estimations. Usually both tests give the same 
results. The t-statistic for α in the restricted equation is 
used in this report. 
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  Downward bias was more frequent among the commodities. However, 
cotton value forecasts were upwardly biased during the third and 
fourth quarters (by $77 and $61 million1    respectively) and coarse grain value was upwardly biased by $353 million in the third 
quarter.  Rice volume forecasts were downwardly biased during the 
last three quarters, and livestock products during the second 
quarter. The downward bias for tobacco volume and animal fats is 
less significant because these forecasts show such poor 
efficiency. 
 
Coarse grain value's upward bias was large, but the size of the 
sample examined was below 10 observations. The smaller the 
sample, the less likely is one to find a normally distributed 
mean if the population is not normally distributed, and the less 
likely these tests are appropriate. Most of the forecasts 
analyzed here had been published for 13 years, every year since 
the U.S. Government switched its fiscal - year to October- 
September. But some forecasts were published for fewer years. The 
first forecast in the Outlook for U.S. Agricultural Exports 
for the value of u.s. coarse grain exports was published in May 
1981. Note that the coarse grain volume forecast, with a sample 
size of 13, does not demonstrate bias. If only forecasts since 
May 1981 are used, then the volume forecasts are also biased 
upward (see section on Consistency). 
 
Although USDA does not publish explicit export price forecasts, 
an average price is implied when forecasts of value and volume 
are published for a commodity. Rounding in the published 
forecasts often deprived these implied prices of precision, but 
they are strongly correlated with actual average export prices. 
 
No bias was apparent in the coarse grain implied price forecasts, 
but cotton and rice prices were biased upward (table 9). Upward 
bias in the cotton price probably accounted for the bias in 
cotton value, but upward bias in rice prices offset downward bias 
in rice volume. The rice value forecasts were unbiased as the 
opposing biases of volume and price offset each other. Possibly, 
biased price expectations were an input in a biased export 
forecast, or vice-versa. 
 
Effect of Partial Year Export Data on the Forecasts 
 
Examining how USDA's forecasts might be formed offers some 
evidence useful in discerning the source of bias. When the three 
forecast updates are published, actual data for part of the year 
being forecast are available (see table 1). This partial year 
data can be compared with exports during the same portion of the 
previous year. The comparison is inevitable, and, given the 
strongly seasonal nature of u.s. agricultural exports, it is also 
a useful forecasting tool (5). In a few isolated cases, the 
following naive model 
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(PA referring to partial year actual data) gave better forecasts 
than USDA's interagency process. This naive model extrapolates 
the percentage change in the partial year data to cover the 
entire year. In two cases, dF'i from the above model was more 
correlated with actual exports than were the published 
forecasts.7 But, more frequently the published forecasts were 
significantly more efficient than the above model. 
 Two cases stand out.  The naive former USSR forecast achieved an 
R2   of 0.21 in the third quarter versus an R2   of 0.92 for USDA's 
published forecast. For North Africa, the naive model's R2 was 
0.23 versus an R2 of 0.. 76 for USDA's forecast. Because USDA's 
forecast performance far exceeded that of the naive model, it is 
obvious that USDA used more information than year-to-date trade performance to forecast u.s. trade with the former USSR and North 
Africa. 
 
These naive forecasts provide a benchmark for comparison with 
USDA's forecasts. In several reports on USDA's forecast accuracy 
the General Accounting Office (11) suggested that USDA find 
benchmarks to gauge forecast accuracy. The above results 
indicate that in some important respects, USDA's forecasts 
compare favorably with the benchmark. 
 
In addition to comparing the benchmark's ability to correlate 
with actual exports to the USDA's ability, it is useful to see if 
USDA was biased with respect to the benchmark. Were USDA's 
forecasts consistently higher or lower than the benchmark derived 
solely from the partial year data? If so, the question then 
becomes whether the decision to disregard this information 
improved USDA's accuracy. Generally, it did not, and, in this 
respect, USDA's forecasts do not compare favorably with the 
benchmark. 
 
Following the methodology used earlier, one first hypothesizes,  
dFi  = α+βdF'i 
 
and estimates the coefficients with ordinary least squares with β 
restricted to 1.  This is equivalent to a matched-pair test to 
determine bias. In this case, the goal is to determine if the 
forecasts are biased with respect to one particular set of 
 
 
 
7For livestock products in the second quarter, R2    = 0.44 for 
dF'i,   versus R2   =  0.08 for dF i,    and for horticultural products in the third quarter, R2  =:   0.93 for dF'i,   versus R2  = 0.76 for dF i. 
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  evidence. Table 10 lists forecasts that demonstrate this sort of 
bias, most of which also demonstrated overall bias in table 8. 
Japan is significantly biased in table 10 and is almost 
significantly biased in table 8 in the same quarters. In other 
words, although USDA's forecasts did not demonstrate significant 
overall bias, the forecasts were regularly based on a belief that 
the rate of growth in exports to Japan would slow later in the 
year. If published forecasts for Japan are converted into annual 
percentage changes, the forecasts are significantly biased 
downward, compared witr1 actual annual percentage changes (table 
11). 
 
USDA's forecasting procedures for exports to the Middle East and 
South Asia appeared upwardly biased in the third quarter, and 
North Africa (almost significant) and East and Southeast Asia 
test similarly in the fourth quarter. Forecasts for the Middle 
East were biased $122 million upward in the third quarter, North 
Africa $50 million upward in the fourth quarter, South Asia $76 
million in the third quarter, and East and Southeast Asia $128 
million in the fourth quarter. The only other regional forecast 
with both forecast bias and an apparently biased forecasting 
procedure was Oceania in the second quarter (both downward). 
 
Sources of Bias in Regional Forecasts 
 
This report does not attempt to exhaustively explore the causes 
of bias in the regional forecasts. But, a number of the upwardly 
biased forecasts share some characteristics that may be relevant 
to their bias: 1) u.s. Government  programs  were involved in one- 
third to three-fourths of the total exports to these regions, 
substantially more than average, 2)wheat and rice accounted for 
a substantially higher than average proportion of u.s. exports to 
these regions, and 3) exports tended to rise to some of these 
regions during the period studied. 
 
U.S. Government programs are involved in a large share of exports 
to most of the upwardly biased regions. This is the 
characteristic common to the largest number of these regions. 
Exports are included in the Government share if they are shipped 
through Public Law (P.L.) 480, the Export Enhancement Program 
(EEP), Section 416, or USDA credit guarantees. The highest share 
of  exports under u.s. Government programs for any region was held 
by an unbiased forecast, Sub-Saharan Africa. Excluding Sub- 
Saharan Africa, the highest Government share of exports of any 
region was found in five of the upwardly biased regions. In 
1.985, the last year with no EEP shipments, u.s. Government 
programs accounted for 15 percent of all u.s. agricultural 
exports, the highest in 13 years. Shares were substantially 
higher, however, for Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and 
Eastern Europe with 30 percent, 52 percent, 74 percent, and 33 
percent, respectively. 
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  Sub-Saharan Africa is a special case because of multilateral 
cooperation among food aid donors. Because concessional, 
humanitarian food aid consistently accounts for a substantial 
portion of the region's imports, donors regularly consult and 
cooperate to ensure that food flows to the region are sufficient 
and orderly. Therefore, many of the decisions regarding the 
levels and- sources of food imports are made by donors rather than 
by importers or governments in Sub-Saharan Africa. The donors 
jointly make their decisions. This multilateral element is 
largely missing from the other regions where the U.S. Government 
share of U.S. agricultural exports is high. 
 
The upward bias in forecasted exports to these regions may have 
reflected  optimism within USDA concerning the efficacy of 
Government programs to promote exports. At the time U S. program 
details are determined, USDA may have every reason to expect that 
each allocation will be consummated by sales. The resources 
available to these programs are not unlimited, and, if USDA plans 
to assist sales in one case, then it must exclude assistance in 
another case. Correctly anticipating  which customers will 
respond to offers under U.S. programs reduces the effort and 
costs required to later reallocate unconsummated offers. 
However, circumstances can change very quickly. As a 1986 ERS 
report noted for North Africa, 
 
[C)ompetition...usually takes the form of credit terms for 
financing wheat sales. Because the terms of the credit 
packages of the .major suppliers vary considerably, the 
actual unit cost of wheat...often varies considerably within 
a given marketing year.   The annual market shares of the 
supplier nations are determined accordingly. (p. 26, 2) 
 
In other words, USDA may formulate  plans to assist exports based 
on what it believes is likely to be actually purchased. USDA 
then bases its published export forecasts on this information. 
Competing exporters, however, pursue pricing strategies of 
undercutting U.S. prices. The United States has been more 
willing to accumulate stocks than other exporters. Some 
countries carry virtually no stocks from one year to the next, 
and the European Community subsidizes exports to prevent stock 
accumulation. These competitors, therefore, .frequently have been 
willing to sell below the U.S. price. 
 
Another characteristic: shared by many of the regions with 
upwardly biased forecasts is that they are important markets for 
wheat or rice. The regions that were large markets for U.S. 
wheat and rice generally had forecasts with poor efficiency. 
Wheat and rice are the least seasonal of all major u.s. 
agricultural export products. Coarse grains, soybeans, soybean 
meal, and cotton are e:ignificantly seasonal, with larger exports 
at the beginning of the fiscal year. Thus, when half the year has passed, more than half the year's total exports have been 
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  shipped. However, because the timing of wheat and rice harvests 
in competing and consuming countries is substantially less 
concentrated than for other crops, customers' import needs and 
U.S. export availability are far less seasonal for wheat and 
rice. The United States harvests both spring and winter wheat 
crops, and competing nations harvest in both the Northern and 
Southern Hemispheres. Many important rice producers harvest 
multiple crops during the year. 
 
Uncertainty may have created conditions that permitted the 
exercise of bias, but bias clearly did not occur in every such 
case. Bias also occurred in other regions where uncertainty 
seemed much less of a problem. Exports to Eastern Europe were 
among the most consistent regional forecasts, with the third 
highest R2 in the second quarter, but the forecasts were biased 
upward in the third and fourth quarters and showed nearly 
significant bias in the second.  Export forecasts for East and 
Southeast Asia were consistent and, like Eastern Europe, had 
wheat and rice account for a smaller than average share of U.S. 
agricultural exports to the region. The forecasts for south and 
Southeast Asia were upwardly biased in the third and fourth 
quarters. 
 
The coincidence between biased regional forecasts and food grain 
customers may simply stem from the fact that the customers mostly 
purchasing wheat and rice are the same customers purchasing crops 
under some form of U.S. Government assistance. Low-income, food- 
grain-importing countries are often under foreign exchange 
constraints, and often rely on exporter assistance in their 
purchases. Another reason may be the greater competitive 
challenges the United States faces marketing wheat and rice 
overseas compared with other major agricultural products. The 
United States faces heavily subsidized competition from EC wheat 
and low-cost rice from Thailand, the world's largest exporter. 
The U.S. share of world trade is smaller for wheat and rice than for corn and soybeans. 1rhe result is greater U.S. government 
participation intended to ensure a level playing field. 
 
One more factor worth noting is an upward trend in exports to 
some of the regions with upwardly biased forecasts. Exports to 
North Africa, the Middle East, and Other Asia (which includes 
both East and Southeast Asia and South Asia) all rose more often 
than they fell during 197'7-89. These regions contain many 
middle-income countries with relatively strong population growth, 
characteristics generally acknowledged to provide the best source 
of growth for world agricultural trade in future years. It is 
possible that too much emphasis was placed on this potential when 
forming the export forecasts. 
 
Similarly, overall economic growth for much of the developing 
world was relatively sluggish during the 1980's, particularly 
when compared with the 1970's.  As prices for petroleum and other 
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 commodities weakened and commercial bank lending contracted, the 
economies of many developing countries were frequently weaker 
than expected. The over-optimistic scenarios that were widely 
accepted for general economic performance by these countries 
would be consistent with over-optimistic expectations of their 
willingness and ability to import goods, including farm products. 
However, although Latin America was a region suffering from such 
a reversal in growth prospects, downward rather than upward bias was found in the u.s. export forecasts for the region. 
 
Downward bias is relatively rare among the regional forecasts. 
The former USSR in the second quarter and Latin America in the 
fourth quarter are the only regions with large, statistically 
significant downward bias. Yet, if some regions are biased 
upward, and the forecast of total exports is unbiased, then one 
would expect offsetting downward bias in other regions. The 
apparent absence of regions with offsetting downward bias might 
lead one to question either the apparent lack of upward bias in 
total exports or the upward bias estimated for some regions. 
 
Downward bias could vary randomly among the regions from one year 
to the next, while the upward bias was regularly focused on 
particular regions. This could be possible if the downward bias 
were in some sense "caused" by the upward bias noted above. The 
upward bias was specific to regions with certain characteristics, 
but if the downward bi.as in other regions resulted from efforts 
to prevent bias from affecting the forecast for total exports, 
then there is no reason for any region to be regularly affected. 
 
Putting the forecasts in a percentage change format results in a 
slight increase in the number of regional forecasts exhibiting 
downward bias (table 11). As noted earlier, Japan's downward 
bias is statistically significant in the percentage change 
format. Japan is biased downward by 5 percent in the second 
quarter and 3 percent .in the third quarter. Latin America in the 
third quarter is another forecast that is biased downward as a 
percentage change but not otherwise. Finally, the fourth quarter 
forecast for centrally planned economies loses its upward bias in 
the switch to percentage change format. 
 
With more downwardly biased regions and one less upwardly biased 
region, the percentage change forecasts demonstrate a better 
balance between the two groups. Stating the forecasts in 
percentage change format in effect changes the weight given to 
errors in various years. In most cases, the differences are 
slight between analysis of forecasts as percentage changes and 
the sort of analysis used elsewhere in this report. One 
exception is u.s. exports to China, which were less than $50 
million in l978 and about 37,000 percent higher the following 
year. USDA forecast a 1,000-percent increase during the first 
quarter that year, but the correlation between forecasts and 
actual changes in the first quarter was 100 percent. This 
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compares with an R2 of 0.46 in table 7. Forecasts were not 
examined in percentage change format in this report in 
anticipation of such distortions. 
 
Sources of Bias in the Commodity Forecasts 
 
The largest case of bias among the commodity forecasts during 
1977-89 was livestock's downward bias. Because Japan is the 
largest market for U.S. livestock products, and both are biased 
downward in the second quarter, a link between the two seems 
worth considering. There is evidence that both the Japan 
forecast and the livestock forecast were downwardly biased 
because USDA regularly underestimated their steady growth, but 
there -is also evidence that the errors are independent. Note 
that the Japan forecast is biased in the third quarter while 
livestock is not (see table 11}.  The volume forecast for animal 
fats is downwardly biased, but Japan accounts for only 4 percent 
of U.S. exports of animal fats. The livestock export forecasts 
may have been based on incorrect data concerning the U.S. cattle 
industry (8). 
 
As noted earlier, the least efficient forecasts among the 
commodities were those for high-value products, such as livestock 
products. The inefficiency may reflect less attention toward 
events in these markets, which would increase the likelihood that 
rapid growth could be unanticipated, resulting in downward bias. 
Although horticultural and dairy products had inefficient 
forecasts and an upward trend in exports, several characteristics 
may mitigate governmen1 inattention. For dairy, one such 
mitigating characteristic is that the U.S. Government accounts 
for most of the exports, shipping nonfat dried milk under food 
aid and other programs (although unbiased, dairy export forecasts 
demonstrate poor efficiency and large MAPE). u.s. horticultural 
production was more heavily weighted toward exports than are 
livestock products and, through marketing orders, have more 
domestic government programs. 
 
 
Consistency 
 
Consistency means to correctly forecast the magnitude of change. 
Export forecasts were examined for inconsistency by testing the 
ordinary least squares estimates of 
 
 
8Livestock product exports during 1977-89 were equivalent to 
4-8 percent of domestic producers' cash receipts. Nut, fresh 
fruit, and fresh vegetable exports were equivalent to 12-19 
percent of growers' cash receipts. Additional exports of 
processed horticultural products ensure that the actual share was 
higher, and the undercounting of exports to Canada also increases 
the actual share. 
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For β = 1. If a forecast fails the test, and there is no bias 
present, it is usually· considered inconsistent. How to interpret 
the test when bias is· present is discussed below.9 
 
The earlier discussion of Ai and Fi versus dAi and dFi noted that using Ai and Fi   amounted to most ng a severe restr1ct on on the model. One can further argue that the dAi and dFi model also is restricted and that loosening the restriction permits an 
intuitive interpretation of the resulting β's. If one postulates 
that the relationship between dAi and dFi  differs depending on whether exports are rising or falling, then dAi  = α  + β dFi   is a restricted model, and the estimated β  is affected by aggregation: 
 
0
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In presenting the results of testing for consistency, I first 
present results based on the restricted model: αr = αf, βr = βf. 
 
Another important factor affecting the estimated value of β is 
autocorrelation. Autocorrelated residuals are important in their 
own right in tests of weak-form rationality (1), and in the tests 
here for consistency they are important because they introduce 
bias into the OLS estimates of β . A handful of the OLS equations 
had Durbin-Watson statistics that indicated autocorrelated 
residuals.10 Before testing for β   =  1, the data for these 
forecasts were transformed using the Prais-Winsten method. 
Prais-Winsten was chosen to preserve degrees of freedom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9seemingly Unrela1ted Regression (SUR) is appropriate for the 
sets of equations used in this report since the error terms are 
highly correlated across equations. Our ability to use SUR was 
constrained by possible linear relationships among the error 
terms and lagged correlations across equations. Evidence that at 
least one of these conditions holds was found in the instability 
of some coefficient estimates from one SUR system to the next. 
The instability is never such that an equation determined to be 
inconsistent with OLS tests for consistency under SUR, but some 
equations consistent under OLS test either way under SUR, 
depending on what other equations are included in the system. 
 
10In the first quarter: total export value, Asia, 
horticultural products, and grains and feeds. In the second 
quarter: sugar and tropical products. In the third quarter: 
China, livestock, Oceania, and coarse grains volume. 
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 Consistency Estimates for the Restricted Model 
 
Underestimates seem more common among the forecasts than 
overestimates. That is,β  > 1 is observed more frequently than β 
<  1.  The magnitude of change in total U.S. agricultural exports 
was typically underestimated about 25 percent by the third- 
quarter forecast (table 12). About a 7-percent underestimate was 
typical during the fourth quarter. As with bias, significant 
inconsistency is more common during the third and fourth 
quarters. This does not necessarily mean that the forecasts 
published in the first half of the year were more accurate: quite 
the opposite according to R2 and MAPE. Instead, the early 
quarter forecasts have a greater degree of random error, which 
could conceal a systematic error like inconsistency. 
 
A lack of consistency 1nay lead to forecast bias or vice-versa. 
If actual exports are ending to increase or decrease, then bias 
and inefficiency are likely to coincide (if actual exports rise 
every year and the forecasts are biased upward, then clearly the 
magnitude of change is overestimated). If actual exports show no 
trend, and if the change in actual exports during the period 
studied averages to zero, then bias and inefficiency are more 
likely to be distinct. 
 
Cotton value was significantly overestimated in the fourth 
quarter, while cotton volume was insignificantly overestimated. 
The cotton estimates leaned toward overestimation in all 
quarters, but reached significance in only one case. In 
addition, cotton value forecasts were biased upward in the last 
two quarters. Similarly, forecast changes for South Asia were 
consistently overestimated, and the forecasts were biased upward. 
 
The only other biased forecast to demonstrate inefficiency 
(excluding Oceania} was Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe's bias 
was in the same direction as South Asia, upward, but its 
inefficiency was in the opposite direction. 
 
With cotton and Eastern Europe, the direction of trend, bias, and 
inefficiency agree in a   manner that makes it impossible to use 
the restricted equation to tell which came first, bias or 
inefficiency. With cotton, overestimated growth possibly led to 
upward bias; with Eastern Europe, underestimated declines 
possibly led to upward bias. South Asia strikes a discordant 
note--it does not seem logical that an overestimated decline 
would led to upward bias. This would imply a bias distinct from 
inefficiency. Relax ng the constraint that αr = αf and βr = βf leads to the conclus1on that the forecasts for Eastern Europe are 
definitely biased, and the forecasts for cotton are likely biased 
as well. 
 
Inconsistency and bias, in some cases, are quite clearly 
distinct. Sub-Saharan Africa was an efficient forecast without a 
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  hint of bias, but with substantial inconsistency. It had the 
second highest R2 of any forecast in the first quarter and a 
higher than average second quarter R2, just below 0.80.  Sub- 
Saharan Africa was the sole first-quarter example of pure 
inefficiency. Table 1shows five forecasts testing for a 
significant lack of consistency in the first quarter. One, South 
Asia, was influenced by bias, and two others suffered from 
extreme rounding errors. Sub-Saharan Africa's forecasted change 
is underestimated by about 59, 61, and 34 percent in the first 
three quarters. Because there is absolutely no trend in exports 
to Sub-Saharan Africa during the period studied, inefficiency 
does not result in bias. 
 
Western Europe was another region with no trend in exports, and 
the third quarter forecasts are inconsistent and underestimated. 
Interestingly, China showed a strong upward trend, was 
inefficient, but showed no bias. USDA avoided downward bias 
despite a tendency to underestimate change in a growing market. 
This growth tendency was probably caused by the fact that the 
United States exported virtually no agricultural products to 
China in fiscal years 1976 and 1977. Had the study period begun 
in a year during which the United States was already achieving 
significant export sales to China,  China's average change would 
probably not be the most positive. 
 If dAi and dFi are largely unrelated, then β = 0.  If there is a weak relationship between the two, then it is possible to have β ≠ 
0, ≠ 1, particularly if β is about midway between 0 and 1. For 
example, in the fourth quarter, the forecast for Oceania has β  = 
0.41 that meets these criteria. However, R2 =  0.70 was very low 
for the fourth quarter and the direction of change was 
incorrectly forecast in 5 years. These problems are largely 
attributable to rounding errors, but illustrate that the value of 
should be clearly attributed to under- or overestimating change 
only for fairly accurate forecasts. Other examples include dairy 
in most quarters and South Asia in the first quarter. 
 
Consistency Estimates for the Unrestricted Model 
 
Dividing the forecasts into two groups corresponding to years of 
rising and falling exports incorporates additional information 
into the equations. The results provide evidence that upward 
bias is more frequently the cause of overestimated change than 
vice-versa. The resu1ts also provide evidence that USDA•s 
forecasts are less accurate in years when exports decline than in 
years they increase. 
 
When exports trend upward, then upward bias would inevitably lead 
to an apparent overestimate of change (β<1), and an overestimate 
of change would inevitably lead to an apparent bias. With the 
restricted equation used above, it is impossible to determine 
which is the cause and which is the result. A tendency to 
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 overestimate change seems counterintuitive, while a tendency to 
underestimate change seems plausible (β>1). The difficulty 
economists have in predicting turning points in the economy has 
been widely documented. It is not too surprising that _models, 
which must be estimated with historical data, fail to anticipate 
changing circumstances. Also, since time series are by nature 
strongly correlated with past values, a similar tendency for 
forecasts of time series data is rational. One would be 
suspicious of evidence that implies that USDA overanticipates 
events. However, some of the estimates for β   in table 12 suggest 
USDA overestimates the amount of annual change by 100 percent. 11 
This can be reconciled by more closely examining how β can vary 
from 1. 
 
A forecast's bias could easily be proportional to amount of 
change. An   upwardly biased forecast might be produced by 
increasing forecast change by 10 percent when exports are 
forecast to rise, and decreasing it by 10 percent when exports 
are forecast to decline. What is important here is that the 
first case is consistent with β  = 0.91 and that the second case 
is consistent with β = 1.11. If export increases and declines 
occur with similar frequency and magnitude, then the estimated β 
of dAi = α + β dFi will be 1.If exports trend upward, however, this bias will lead to β <1. 
 
To discern such cases, the following equation was estimated: 
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This equation has no constant term, with αr and αf being dummy 
variables corresponding to rising and falling exports. The 
proportional bias described above would imply βr  = 2 - βf. 
 
There are several issues associated with estimating such a model. 
One is that if one can reject the pair of restrictions,   αr = αf  
and βr = βf then it may be necessary to estimate separately 
rising and falling exports. The difference in the parameters may 
mean differences between the two sets of residuals and the 
associated variances. Unfortunately, given an overall sample 
 
 
 
11Intuitively,β = 0.5 means that 50 percent of the forecast 
is excess. Restating β so that the excess of the forecast is 
stated as a percentage of the actual: (1/β) - 1. Thus, when β = 0.5, half the forecast is excess, and the forecast is 100 percent 
greater than the actual value. Most of the estimated ,β's are 
closer to 1, and the difference between β and 1/β is 
substantially smaller. 
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  size of 13 observations, dividing the samples into two sets makes 
for extremely small samples.12 
 
In some cases, this model results in values of a and J3    that imply 
a "complex" relationship between dAi and dFi. "Complex" is used 
as a description to co1otrast with a simple case of bias or 
inconsistency. A simple case of bias or inconsistency is one 
where αj and βj (where j = r or f) both imply the same relationship be dAi and dFi  :for example, αr<O  and βr<1,  or αf <0 and βf >l. Each member of each pair above implies upward bias. 
The closest to this simplest case of bias is the forecast for 
Eastern Europe in the fourth quarter (t-statistics for the 
difference from zero in parentheses): 
 
αr  = 0.024  (0.632) αf  = -0.011   (0.364 ) 
 
βr  = 0.78  (11.262) βf   = 1.19 (14.137). 
 
This bias is not ideal because αr  has the wrong sign. However, 
this bias is of little concern because each αj is so clearly insignificant and each βj is so clearly different from 1. The relationship between dAi   and dFi is a simple one of the forecast 
being biased upward 20  percent. 
 
An example of a "complex" relationship is the forecast for 
Western Europe in the fourth quarter: 
 
αr  = 0.130  (1.273) αf   = -o .312  ( 2.394) 
 
βr   = 0.98  (11.672) βf   = 0.7 3 ( 8.133).
 
Note that αf<0 implies an upward bias, but βf<1 implies that the declines are overestimated causing a downward bias. In each 
case, the difference is significant. The estimated values of αr and βr imply bias in different directions, but in neither case are the tendencies significant. Reestimating the equation 
after restricting  either αr = αf = 0 or βr = βf = 1 reveals which of the opposing tendencies predominates: downward bias for both the rising and falling years, but the bias is not significant. 
 
Upwardly Biased Forecasts. The fourth-quarter forecast for 
Eastern Europe is an example in which relaxing the restrictions 
αr = αf and βr = βf provides some insight into the appearance of 
bias. The f1rst section on inconsistency highlighted this 
forecast's underestima1:ed change and declining trend as a 
possible cause of upwa1rd bias. However, because the tendency to 
underestimate change did not extend to periods when exports rose 
 
 
12The pair of restrictions is rejected quite frequently: 
all but three of the first-quarter forecasts studied rejected it 
with 10-percent significance. The restrictions were rejected 
less frequently in subsequent quarters; the restrictions could 
not be rejected for a majority of the fourth-quarter forecasts. 
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 and was replaced by a tendency to overestimate change, bias seems 
to be a factor. 
 
Cotton value was an example of an apparent overestimate possibly 
causing bias according to the restricted coefficient estimates. 
Relaxing the restrictions gives results that imply that upward 
bias was confined to years when exports rose. Earlier, when αr = αf and βr = βf were imposed, the estimated β was less than 1 because of the effect of aggregating βr<1 and βf = 1 with exports rising in more years than falling. Therefore, the presence of 
β<1 seems to be a result of upward bias rather than representing 
its cause. This also seems to describe the forecasts for South 
Asia in all four quarters. 
 
North Africa and the Middle East are also upwardly biased, and, 
although the restricted estimates for f3    did not imply significant 
inconsistency, dividing the forecasts into rising and falling 
years provides useful insights. The results imply that USDA has 
more problems with these forecasts during years exports fall than 
when they rise.   
 
For North Africa, estimating the unrestricted fourth quarter 
equation gives βf = 0.  This is also true in the third quarter and when estimating with αr = αf = 0.  In the second quarter, when estimating with αr = αf = 0,βf ≠ 0 significantly, but with the wrong sign! The negative sign implies that the forecast is 
in the wrong direction. The same estimated βf for the Middle East also has the same sign,but is not significantly different 
from zero.For North Africa, an estimate with the wrong sign is 
also significant in the first quarter. This is not the only 
forecast where βf has the wrong sign in the first quarter.When estimated with αr = αf = 0, horticultural and poultry products forecasts also have significant βf estimates with inappropriate signs (table 13). No forecast’s estimated βr in any quarter has a negative sign.  Estimated values for βf are far more frequently insignificant than those for βf tables 14-16). This indicates that USDA has more trouble correctly 
forecasting exports in years when exports decline. 
 
This asymmetric tendency is also relevant to the forecast for 
coarse grains volume. It was noted earlier that the forecasts 
for coarse grain exports appeared upwardly biased in both value 
and volume when the period of analysis is restricted to 1981-89. 
During this period,  u.s. coarse  grain exports generally declined. 
 
When coarse grains volume data for 1977-89 are examined with 
rising and falling years separated, the estimates imply forecasts 
during declining years are more biased and less accurate than 
forecasts during rising years. Because exports rose more years 
than they fell during 1977-89, USDA's forecasts avoided bias on 
average during this period. This is fortunate because coarse 
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 grains are the United States' highest volume export and sometimes 
its highest value export as well. 
 
Other Forecasts. Unlike the upwardly biased forecasts, most of 
the downwardly biased forecasts stem from problems during years 
that exports rose. Both rice and sugar and tropical products 
(second quarter) are characterized by an upward trend, 
underestimated change (β>1), and downward bias. Sugar and 
tropical products' bias seems to result from the underestimated 
change, since both rising- and falling-year forecasts display 
underestimated change. Rice seems more likely to be directly 
biased. The second quarter was the only quarter where the rice 
forecasts were both inconsistent and biased. Both the bias and 
the inconsistency seem confined to rising year exports. 
 
The less restricted equations are also useful for exploring 
forecasts that are inconsistent but without any average bias. By 
definition, if a forecast is equally inconsistent during rising 
and falling years, then it will also be biased during rising and 
falling years. The biases will be in opposite directions and can 
average to zero bias over all years. Restricted OLS estimates 
found inconsistency in the forecasts for Sub-Saharan Africa 
(first three quarters), Western Europe, and China (both in the 
third quarter). Less restricted estimates found that the 
inconsistency was essentially the same during rising and falling 
years. Each βj was greater than one, usually equally greater than one during rising and falling years for each region. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
USDA's quarterly export forecasts were largely efficient and 
unbiased, although they showed signs of being consistently 
cautious. The forecasts for grain exports were the most accurate 
of the group. They generally had the smallest percentage error 
and the best correlation, but the magnitude of change was 
conservatively forecast. Given the importance of grain to total 
exports, this led to conservative forecasts of change for total 
U.S. agricultural exports. Cotton exports were also accurate, 
matching grains in correlation, but showing bias and larger 
average errors. Cotton exports also varied from grain exports in 
that the forecasts were not conservative: the magnitude of 
change was overestimated on average. Since the 9verestimation 
was confined to the years exports rose, bias probably caused the 
overestimated change. Oilseed and product forecasts were less 
accurate than grain and cotton forecasts, probably due to the 
concentration of trade among a small number of countries. 
 
Upward bias occurred in the forecasts of exports to a number of 
less developed countries that chiefly imported food grains and 
also received U.S. Government assistance in their purchases. 
Conclusions regarding the causes of upward bias in the regional 
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  forecasts can come only after further research. In some cases, 
the bias seemed concentrated in years when exports to a given 
region rose; in other •cases the bias seemed concentrated in years 
when exports to the region fell. 
 
The upward bias found for a number of regional forecasts does not 
necessarily reflect a bias by analysts responsible for 
concentrating on any o:f these regions. The regional forecasts 
published in the Outlook for u.s. Agricultural Exports are based 
on unpublished commodity forecasts that receive interagency 
review. Each month USDA publishes  forecasts  of expected 
marketing year u.s. e ort volume for a number of crops produced 
through a process of interagency review. To reach a consensus 
regarding the total foJr U.S. exports, unpublished forecasts of u.s. exports to each u.. s. customer are formulated. These 
unpublished forecasts are then combined with ERS price forecasts 
to form the foundation of the published forecasts for the total 
value of U.S. agricultural exports to various regions. The 
regional forecast bias found in this report may stem from errors 
in either the interage11cy or the ERS component of these published 
forecasts. · 
 
Downward bias occurred in forecasts to some developed regions and 
the largest high-value commodity group, livestock products. 
Japan was the only developed-country forecast that was close to 
being biased and also important and otherwise accurate. But, its 
possible bias was less than 2 percent of the value of fiscal 1989 
exports to that market  Livestock's bias was of equivalent 
absolute magnitude and totaled little more than 3 percent of 
fiscal 1989 exports. In both cases, underestimates of rapid 
export growth probably led to downward bias. 
 
While it is of course desirable to eliminate such systematic 
errors, increasing forecast reliability is likely to entail 
costs. Any desire to improve forecast accuracy must be balanced 
by considerations of how costs compare with benefits. USDA is 
unlikely to reorient its intelligence-gathering efforts toward 
high-value products simply to increase the accuracy of its export 
forecasts for these products. 
 
The first step is discovering systematic errors. Unforeseeable 
events will always result in some forecast error, but when errors 
fall into discernible patterns they represent behavior that can 
be altered to improve forecast accuracy. 
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 Appendix 
 
The following decomposition of MSE is commonly used to analyze 
forecast accuracy: 
      
DRB
AFAF
UUUFMSE
AFFMSE


)(
11)( 2222
2 
 
 
  
The three components are referred to as the "bias" component 
(UB), the "regression" component (UR), and the "disturbance" 
component (UD). A forecast with no bias or regression component is 
considered generally preferable, given comparable levels of 
MSE(F.). UR i s  more typically shown in a slightly different 
formulation (2,3,4)but this equivalent, a clearer formulation,is 
occasionally used (1, 5). 
 
UR and UD bear a relationship to the coefficients of a regression 
of Ai on Fi. Given, 
A = α +βF + ε , then 
 
UR = 0 if β = 1, and UD    approaches zero as the regression's R2 
approaches 100. 
 
The drawback of using this decomposition of MSE is demonstrated 
by the fact that, despite the conventions in naming each MSE 
component, bias could cause both UR ≠ 0 and  UB ≠ 0 
simultaneously. 
 
Imagine a forecasting  process under a condition of perfect 
foresight: the actual data are anticipated exactly. Forecasts 
could then be generated by multiplying the anticipated actual 
data by some number, z ≠ 1. If the number were consistently 
greater than 1, then the forecasts would be biased upward. A 
regression of A1  on Fi ,would yield a coefficient for Fi significantly  smaller than 1, and UR   would not equal zero. The 
simple MSE(Fi) decomposition would imply the error was divided 
between the bias component and the regression component when in 
fact a form of bias was solely responsible. There would be no 
point in distinguishing between UB  and UR . 
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 Grains and feeds 12 9 5 3Wheat and flour 15 10 7 4Rice 11 11 9 5
coarse grains 22 14 8 2
Soybean cake and meal 14 8 5 4
Soybean oil  21 19 12 10
 
Table 2--Average  percentage error in value forecasts, by commodity 
and quarter, 1977-891 
 
 
Commodity 
First Second Third 
quarter quarter quarter 
Fourth 
quarter 
 
 
 
Exports: 
Mean absolute percent error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oilseeds and products 
Soybeans 
12  9  5 3 
15 9 7 3 
 
 
 
Livestock products 12- 9
 
5 2
Poultry and products 15 10 10 6
Dairy products 16 16 18 11
Horticultural products 7 6 4 3
Tobacco 6 5 5 6
Cotton and linters 19 13 7 5
Sugar and tropical products 15 10 8 5
Total export value 10 7 4 1
I1nports 6 4
 
3 2Trade balance 23 16 11 4
  1some value forecasts were made only during 1981-89:  Wheat and 
flour, coarse grains, rice, soybeans, soybean meal, and soybean 
oil. 
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  Table 3--Average percentage error in volume forecasts, by 
commodity and quarter, 1977-891 
 
 
Commodity 
First Second 
quarter quarter 
Third Fourth 
quarter quarter 
 
 
Mean absolute percent error 
 
Wheat and flour   10  7  6 4Coarse grains  11 9 5 2Rice  11 9 10 7Soybeans  8 8 6 2Oilseed cake and meal 12 9 6 3
Animal fats  12 7 5 5Tobacco  17 16 16 18Cotton and linters 17 12 5 3
Other  8 7 5 4Total  8 7 3 2
1Total volume and other volume forecasts were studied only for 
1981-89.  Earlier data 'Were not directly comparable. 
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Table 4--Average percentage error in value forecasts, by region 
and quarter, 1977-891 
 
First second Third Fourth 
Region quarter quarter quarter quarter 
 
 
Mean absolute percent error 
 
Western Europe  13  9 5  2
Eastern Europe 23 16 11 8
Former USSR 37 22 13 6
Asia 10 6 4 2
Japan 9 7 5 3
China 66 38 18 11
Other Asia 11 7 5 4East and Southeast Asia2 9 7 4 4
South Asia2 31 21 16 10
Middle East 19 14 13 4
Africa 11 8 8 6
North Africa 14 10 8 7
Sub-Saharan Africa 21 17 13 6
Latin America 17 13 9 5
Mexico 23 21 17 10Other Latin America 9 7 7 5
canada 7 6 6 3
Oceania 20 15 18 17
Developed countries 6 5
 
3 
 
3
Less developed countries; 12 9 6 4
Centrally planned countries 32 20 12 7
1Mexico and Other Lati1n America were forecast only during 
1981-89.  In the first quarter the earliest forecasts were for 
1982. 2Data are for 1977-87. 
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 rains and feeds 60 81 95 98
Wheat and flour 60 77 93 96
Rice 67 63 88 97
coarse grains 61 89 95 99
 
Table 5--correlation of forecast change with actual change in 
value, by commodity  and quarter,  1977-891: Regression coefficient 
of determination (R2 ) 
 
 
Commodity 
First 
quarter 
Second 
quarter 
Third Fourth 
quarter quarter 
 
 
Percent 
 
G 
 
 
 
 
Oilseeds and products 5 45 81 98 
soybeans  5 71 78 94Soybean cake and meal 31 76 85 89
Soybean oil  57 68 89 97
Livestock products 9 8  53 93
Poultry and products 6 45 45 91
Dairy products 45 54 41 67
Horticultural products 50 60 76 90
Tobacco 37 57 56 53
Cotton and linters 60 87 95 98
Sugar and tropical products 50 85 96 98
Total 38 70 92 98
 
1some value forecasts were made only during 1981-89:  Wheat and 
flour, coarse grains, rice, soybeans, soybean meal, and soybean 
oil. 
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 Wheat and flour 55 76 86 97
Coarse grains 16 63 90 97Rice 50 68 61 91
 
Table 6--correlation of forecast change with actual change in 
volume by commodity and quarter, 1977-891: Regression coefficient 
of determination (R2) 
 
 
Commodity 
First Second Third Fourth 
quarter quarter quarter quarter 
 
 
Percent 
 
 
 
 
Soybeans 
Oilseed cake and meal Animal fats 
Tobacco 
Cotton and linters 
Other1 
Total1 
70 77 87 97 
50 66 84 98 0 46 68 81 
0 11 11 17 70 86 97 99 0 3 63 64 
20 55 92 97 
 
1Both total and other volume during 1977-80 are inconsistent with 
those published since 1981. 
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  Table 7--correlation of forecast change with actual change, by 
region and quarter,1977-891: Regression coefficient of 
determination (R2 ) 
 
 
Region 
 
 
 
 
 Western Europe 
Eastern Europe 
Former USSR 
Japan 
China 
Other Asia 
East and Southeast Asia2 
South Asia2 
Middle East 
North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 
Latin America 
Mexico Other Latin America 
Canada 
Oceania 
 
Developed countries 
Less developed countries 
Centrally planned countries 
First Second Third Fourth 
quarter quarter  quarter quarter 
 
 
Percent 
 
5 49 90 97 
54 87 81 96 
26 88 92 98 
54 73 89 97 
46 75 94 99 25 60 90 95 
37 63 90 93 
58 78 83 94 
1 15 42 94 
16 47 76 80 67 79 85 95 
41 67 84 95 
52 57 75 91 
15 67 89 97 
59 57 58 91 32 69 67 70 
 
18 55 88 97 
34 63 99 98 
49 90 96 99 
 
1Mexico and Other Latin 
 
America were 
 
forecast 
 
only 
 
during 
1981-89. In the first quarter the earliest forecasts were for 
1982. 2Data are for 1977-87. 
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 Table a--Forecast bias, by quarter, 1977-891 
 
Commodity and 
region 
 
 
 
 
Commodity: 
Rice 
 
Tobacco 
 
Animal fats 
 
 
 
 
Coarse grains2 
First Second Third Fourth 
quatrter quarter quarter qua.rter 
 
 
1,000 me·tric tons 
 
-155 -140 -147 (2.276)* (1..955)* (3. 754).. 
-22 (1.980)* 
-60  -35 (1.851)* (1.915)1\' 
 
Million dollars 
 
353 (2.050)* 
Livestock products 
 
Cotton 
 
Sugar and tropical 
-187 (1.953)* 
 
 
 
77 (1.839)* 
 
 
 
61 (2.037>* 
products -50 (2.007>* 
 
Region: 
Eastern Europe 88 
(1.611) 
 
 
80 (2.033)* 
 
 
57 (2.236)" 
Former USSR 
Japan 
Other Asia 
 
East and 
Southeast Asia3 
 
South Asia3 l86 
(2.736)** 
Middle East 
 
North Africa 124 
(2.0:29)* 
Latin America 
-200 (1.915*) 
-207 
<1.679) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 (2.304)** 
 
 
 
85 (1.940)* 
 
 
 
-138 (1.698) 
185 (2.992)** 
 
117 (2.223>* 
95 (2.995)** 
129 (2.117)'1\' 
70 (2.271)* 
 
 
 
 
 
163 
(3.755)** 
 
135 (3.080)11* 
41 
(1.853>* 
44 (2.226)* 
47 
ci.733> 
-127 (2.314)* 
Oceania -26 (3.797)* 
Centrally planned 
countries 
 
 
115 (1.800)* 
 
115 (2.405)** 
 
1T-s*tatistics for difference from zero in parentheses: *= significant at 10 percent 
* *  =  significant at 5 percent. 2Data are for 1981-89. 3Data are for 1977-87. 
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 First Second Third Fourth quarter quarter quarter quarter
.2
Table 9--Bias in implied price forecasts, by quarter, 1981-891 
 
 
Commodity 
 
 
 
 
 
Rice 
 
Cotton2 
 
Wheat and flour 
Dollars per metric ton 
 
22 17 
(1.959)* (2.002)* 
70 53 30 (3.005)** (2.384>** (2.848)** 
-3 -4 (3.531)** (3.813)** 
Soybean meal -6 (2.373)* 
 
1T-statistics for difference from zero in parentheses: * = significant a.t 10 percent ** = significant at 5 percent. Cotton and tobacco are the only commodities with implied price forecasts available during 1977-89. The other implied price forecasts are for 1981-89. 
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  Table 10- USDA forecast bias compared with naive model, by 
quarter, 1977-891 
 
Commodity and 
region 
 First 
quarter2 
Second 
quarter 
Third 
quarter 
Fourth 
quarter 
 
 
 
 
 
C01nmodity: 
Rice 
 
Tobacco 
 
Animal fats 
1.000 metric tons 
 
 
-241 -222 -202 
(2.035>* (2.241)** (2.389.). 
-23 (2.505)** 
-81 -46 -37 (1.732) (2.410)** (2.038)* 
 
 
 
 
Rice 
 
Soybean meal 
 
 
 
 
 
-13:4 (2.6116)** 
Million dollars 
 
-58 (1.851) 
Livestock products 11.8 
(2.001)* 
Horticultural 18:0 
(5.101)*" 
-217 
(2.209)** 
Poultry 312 (4.462)* 
 
Region: 
Japan -254 -191 
(2.753)** (1.840)* 
Other Asia 44l2 159 131 
(2.732>** (2.077)* (2.372>** 
East and south- 
east Asia 3 !8 128 (2.3:70)** (2.736)** 
South Asia 76 
(2.051)* 
Middle East 217 122 48 (3.384)** (2.203)** (1.729) 
North Africa 194 50 (3.9';11)** (1.629) 
Oceania -32 (2.501)** 
 
1T-statistics for difference from zero in parentheses: * = significant a1:10 percent ** = s1gnificant at 5 percent. 2There are no partial year data available in the first quarter. Thus, the naive forecast is the previous year's unadjusted total. 
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  Table 11--Bias of implied percentage change forecasts, by 
quarter, 1977-891 
 
Commodity and 
region 
First 
quarter 
Second 
quarter 
Third 
quarter 
Fourth 
quarter 
 
 
 
 
 
Commodity: 
Percent of volume 
Rice -6.7 -7.5 -6.5 -6.5 
(1.9'25)* (2.421>** (2.032}* (3.594)** 
Tobacco -9.0 (2.141)* 
Animal fats -6.•8 -4.9 -2.9 (1.821)* (2.018)* (2.161)* 
 
Percent of value 
 
Livestock products -5.8 
(2.230)* 
Cotton 7.2 5.5 (1.631) (1.754)* 
Sugar and tropical 9.0 (2.652)** 
 
Region: 
Eastern Europe 6.1 6.4 4.7 (1.640) (2.488)** (2.349)** 
Former USSR -19.5 (2.423)** 
Japan -5.2 -4.8 -3.1 
(1.702) (2.007)1< (1.982)* 
Other Asia 4.2 3.7 (2.893.)... (3.639)** 
Middle East 7.9 2.9 (2.117)* (2.362>** 
North Africa 9.0 6.4  5.8 (1.9')18)* (1.912)* (2.314)** 
Latin America -10.4 -5.6  -4.4 
(1.649) (1.834)* (2.583)** 
Oceania -14.9 (3.339)** 
 
1T-statistics for difference from zero in parentheses: 
* = significant at 10 percent 
** = s1gnificant at 5 percent. 
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 Table 12--Forecasts lacking consistency, by quarter, 1977-891 
 
Commodity and 
region 
First 
qua1rter 
Second 
quarter 
Third 
quarter 
Fourth 
quarter 
 
 
Commodity: 
Total value 
 
Grains and feeds 
 
Dairy .47 
Estimated coefficient value 
 
1.26 L07 (2.385)** <1.77>* 
1. 21 (2.464)** 
.46 .36 .72 
 
Cotton value 
 
Sugar and trop- 
(3.4i·7>** (4.140)** (4.740)** (1.819)* 
.95 (1.915)* 
ical products 2 0 2:1 (2.3.9)** 
Total volume 
 
Rice 
1. 38 (4.780)** 
 
 
1.31 (1.933)* 
 
 
 
 
 
1.21 (3.196)** 
Coarse grains 
 
Cotton 
1.820 1.24 (1.942>* (1.954)* 
 
 
 
.94 
 
Region: 
Western Europe 
 
Eastern Europe 
 
China 
 
South Asia • 5·3 (3.167)** 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 33 (2.179>• 
 
 
 
.73 (2.04)* 
 
 
1.24 (2.000)* 
 
 
 
1.18 (1.972)'* 
{1.735) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.85 (1.998)* 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 1. 5>9 
{1.7 .6)* 
Canada 
 
Oceania .31 (5.025)** 
 
 
1. 61 (2.47)** 
 
 
 
.63 (2.846)** 
 
1. 34 (2.010)* 
 
 
 
. 41 (6.644)** 
 
 
 
 
.86 
(l.774) 
. 41 (7.205)"** 
Less developed 
countries 
 
Centrally planned 
countries 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 36 (2.590)** 
 
 
1.23 (1.794)* 
 
 
1.23 (2.610)** 
 
 
1.11 (2.135>* 
1T-statistics for difference from zero in parentheses: 
* = significant at 10 percent ** = significant at 5 percent. 
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 **significant at 10
Table 13—Forecasts with incorrect signs for βf when αr=αf=01,2 
 
Commodity and 
region 
First 
quarter 
Second 
quarter 
Third 
quarter 
Fourth 
quarter 
 
 
 
 
 
Commodity: 
Estimated coefficient value 
Horticultural -1.10 
(2.424)** 
Poultry 
 
Region: 
Middle East 
 
North Africa 
-2.55 
(2.0143)* 
 
 
-.51 
(1.7'11) 
-.61 
(1.1!198)* 
 
 
 
 
- .. 60 
(1.110) 
-1.26 
(2.182)* 
 
 
 
 
-1.08 
(2.0140)* 
 
1T-s*tatistics .for difference from zero in parentheses: 
significant at 5 percent. 2No estimates for βr had incorrect signs. 
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